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The negotiations during the World Trade Organization 
rounds have called into question the lack of consensus 
on the liberalization/regulation of trade in various 
sectors –agriculture, automotive, semi-manufactured 
goods and services— that directly affect the develo-
ping countries. The de-veloped countries have stren-
gthened their positions giving priority to agreements 
in the service sector with Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA) which comprises the areas of telecommuni-
ca-tions, e-commerce, air and maritime transport, bio-
technology, movement of natural persons, na-tional 
regulations and postal services. As a strategic sector, 
it constitutes nearly 80% of the US and UE economies. 
The negotiations around TISA, Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partner-ship (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) occurred behind closed doors as pa-
rallel negotia-tions under the leadership of the United 
States and European Union. With the collaboration of 
other 23 countries, according to documents obtai-
ned by WikiLeaks, they excluded the BRICS countries 
and others. Arising instability and lack of legitimacy 
among multilateral agencies after the financial and 
economic crisis of 2008, call into question the entities 
created after the Bretton Woods Conferences. This 
study aims to identify the consequences that these 
agreements will bring in the field of international tra-
de in relation to the BRICS countries, and specifically 
about Brazil.
Las negociaciones durante las rondas de la Organi-
zación Mundial de Comercio han puesto en cuestio-
namiento la falta de consenso sobre la liberalización/
regulación del comercio en varios sectores –agricultura, 
automotriz, bienes semi-facturados y servicios– que 
afecta directamente a los países en desarrollo. Los 
países desarrollados han endurecido sus posiciones 
priorizando acuerdos en el sector de los servicios con 
el Acuerdo sobre Comercio en Servicios (TISA, por sus 
siglas en inglés) el cual engloba las áreas de telecomuni-
caciones, comercio electrónico, transporte aéreo y ma-
rítimo, biotecnología, movimiento natural de personas, 
regulaciones nacionales y servicios pos-tales. Como un 
sector estratégico, constituye casi el 80% de las econo-
mías de Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea. Las nego-
ciaciones en torno al TISA, a la Asociación Transatlántica 
de Comercio e Inversión (TTIP, por sus siglas en inglés) 
y el Acuerdo Transpacífico (TPP) ocurrieron tras puertas 
cerradas como negociaciones paralelas bajo la égida de 
Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea. Con la colaboración 
de otros 23 países, de acuerdo a los documentos obte-
nidos por Wiki-Leaks, excluyeron a los países del BRICS y 
a otros, en el contexto de una emergente inestabilidad 
y falta de confianza en las agencias multilaterales tras 
la crisis económica de 2008 puso en tela de juicio a las 
entidades creadas Bretton Woods. En este marco, este 
trabajo se propone identificar las consecuencias que 
estos acuerdos pueden tener en el campo del comercio 
internacional en relación a los países del BRICS y especí-
ficamente en el caso de Brasil.
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Introduction
After the crisis of 2008, it has been observed in the international relations that the develo-
ped countries (US, EU, Japan and Canada) have prioritized the formation of commercial, even 
sec-toral, treaties, with the objective of more than merely protecting niche markets, but abo-
ve all the expansion of certain strategic sectors.
Free-trade treaties are not new to the functionality of state-market relations, some have 
been placed into practice such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
continued the peripheral situation of Mexico, and others have not come into effect like the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), due to a change in the Latin American political 
landscape. However the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP) and the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), the trinity-T, are trea-
ties with a different format, since they go beyond negotiations on tariff reductions.
The aim of this study is to highlight how developed countries, when using parallel treaties, 
deep-en the critical state of political functionality of the multilateral entities created after 
Bretton Woods. For instance, the United Nations that found itself unable to act regarding the 
unilateral action of the US in the invasion of Iraq, yet is able to take broader action in trade 
treaties such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The question of legitimacy still remains a fundamental concept in the field of ideas that are 
re-flected in the real world. Fonseca (1998) explains the proposal of the New International 
Econom-ic Order (NIEO) during the Cold War, where, at the heart of the contradictions of this 
order, the Third World countries, within the structure of the created international system, 
launched projects, even in limited ways, alternative to the hegemonic powers. The author 
brings the complex rela-tion between values and power in the construction of the interna-
tional order, in which even though the central countries use military and economic power as 
fundamental pillars, they still need to consolidate that power with the diffusion of ideas and 
concepts that point to the best way to organize the international system.
In addressing the legitimacy of the non-hegemonic in the post-Cold War era, Fonseca (1998) 
projected that China’s entry into the WTO could bring greater stability to the international 
system, but at the same time warns whether this would really be accepted in a non-conflic-
tive way by world powers, based on the provisions and interpretations of international law 
in the search for consensus. Certainly, the questioning still remains valid, if in this post-Cold 
War order develop-ing countries proposals would be legitimated.
In the dispute for legitimacy and more space for new blocs and countries within multilateral 
enti-ties, BRICS countries have adopted a tactical horizon since their first diplomatic meeting 
in 2009. Since then, the bloc has undoubtedly been proactive in the negotiations and propo-
sals for eco-nomic guidelines in the WTO and other multilateral entities. Each country has its 
own character-istics, specificity and priority areas of commercial expansion, but all of them 
exerting pressures in the existing multilateral spaces.
In the process of intra-bloc institutional maturity and significant contextual changes prior 
to the 2008 crisis, followed especially by the commodity boom, the international scenario 
began to exert a set of political, economic and military pressures on the BRICS.
Much more than a simple acronym and a set of acronyms created by a corporate official 
(Baum-man, 2015), the BRICS in recent years (2009-2016) have suffered a counter-offensive 
on several fronts, and one of these offensives is done in part because of the pressures these 
countries have coordinated within the WTO.
In any case, it does not present itself as an open and stated offensive of the developed coun-
tries, that continue to make agreements with the BRICS, but the level of competition now en-
ters into a frame of confrontation, sometimes subtle, sometimes in the open. The relationship 
between the BRICS and developed countries around internationally important issues is be-
coming increasingly discordant. By identifying the issues of disagreement and interventions 
in the bilateral policies for each BRICS country, we will see situations of action/reaction and 
destabilization of domestic and foreign policies in different ways.
In the context of the WTO we have a concrete factor in the development of our analysis, the 
ex-clusion of the BRICS and other countries from the TISA/TTIP negotiations. Decisions that 
have been taken in parallel meetings, and the reasons why the central bloc (US and EU) have 
decided to make changes away from the standards of multilateral entities, is the aim of this 
article. 
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The bridge of our analysis encompasses the role that the services sector has taken in these 
negoti-ations, being treated with greater complexity, due to its dynamics and importance in 
the high-tech value chains and insertion in the financial system. In this way, we will be able to 
discern the possible impacts that Brazil can represent to this framework of alliances between 
the BRICS countries and its exclusion from the TISA/TTIP/TPP agreements.
TISA/TTIP/TPP: A Reaction to the WTO
Called “dark trade” by many in civil society, the fact that after 21 rounds of TISA negotia-
tions, which formally began in 2013, and informally in 2011, and 15 rounds of TTIP meetings 
in the period 2013-2016, it is possible to interpret the intentions for which the developed 
countries, and their decision-making nucleus, the US and EU (mainly Germany), have built a 
parallel space to the WTO, together with underdeveloped and developing countries as mere 
adjuncts, but with greater geopolitical affinity in order to expedite agreements not only in 
the services sector (TISA) but also in goods (TTIP).
When Wikileaks presented, in June 2015, the confidential documents of the 6th round of 
the TISA negotiations held in Switzerland in 2014, it marked a new situation in international 
rela-tions. The sectoral interests of a group of countries that anticipated changes in their na-
tional legis-lations and of the WTO’s regulatory treaties in the service sector would be taking 
place on the margins of the international order that they themselves created.
The way the negotiations have been conducted and the future global impact of the TISA / 
TTIP agreements can be compared to the end of the gold standard in 1971, the oil shock in 
1973, or the failed ambition of the FTAA; that is, the definitive dismantling of the order crea-
ted at Bret-ton Woods.
We can see in a 2013 EU memorandum that they are explicit that the TISA is a treaty only for 
“Really Good Friends of Services”, comparable to a narrow code of organizations with more 
ob-scure intentions. This memorandum attempts to legitimize this initiative of a new moda-
lity of parallel negotiations, due to the impasses that occurred in the Doha Round especially 
at the 8th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 2011.
The objective of this broad group of developed and developing countries would be to set up 
a framework for deregulation that would cover domestic regulation (eg. authorizing and li-
censing procedures), international maritime transport, telecommunication services, e-com-
merce, computer related services, cross-border data (EU Memo, 2013).
The scope of this sector for the US/EU is of extreme importance in international trade, since 
the raw goods and industrial sectors have their limits and have been decreasing in importan-
ce for some years. Be it because of physical/environmental limits which, in the case of agri-
culture, gives developing countries advantages as exporters of raw material with little added 
value, although the large multinationals in this sector (Monsanto, Bunge, Syngenta, Cargil 
and others) have their headquarters in developed countries. Be it the deindustrialization oc-
curring in central countries, caused by industrial plant facilities in Asia and elsewhere with 
cheaper labor, particularly in Chi-na.
The service sector is important to the U.S. Every billion dollars exported from the service 
sector generated more than 7,300 jobs in 2015, while the same figure represented 5,000 jobs 
in 2013. The service sector represents three-quarters of U.S. GDP, creating four out of five 
new jobs (US Department Commerce).
For the countries of the European Union services represent 70% of the GDP and of news jobs 
created, and represents 25% of exports. Together the 23 countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, the EU, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, 
Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru , Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United States) participating in the TISA negotiations comprise 70% of the 
world trade in services, with the goal of continued expansion.
The TISA, as a parallel agreement, would serve as the basis for a broader treaty outside 
the WTO structure, opening up space for member countries if they wanted to join portions 
of the TISA that treat their preference items. In a process of persuading leaders from other 
countries that have not yet joined, it would act as an “automatic multilateralism” agreement, 
damaging the founding principle of most-favored nation status.
The structure created in the WTO for the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
was divided into four areas: domestic regulation, emergency safeguards, government pro-
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curement, and subsidies. For countries that have joined the TISA, this structure is seen as 
limited. TISA documents show that the accord will include telecommunications, maritime 
transport, financial services and the movement of service providers to temporarily provide 
services, but the objective is to go further.
Following the parallel creation of TISA, the GATS Council for Trade in Services is “informed” 
about the parallel negotiations and, where possible, aims to pursue the same objectives of 
joint liberalization. The impacts of trade liberalization measures between these countries 
would primar-ily be to implement a process of continuous deregulation with the reduction of 
tariffs and the strengthening of the most competitive companies.
Having released 17 documents that serve as a summary and basis for the negotiations, we 
find a set of notable contradictions in the agreement’s process. In order to demarcate the 
rules in a hori-zontal way, the first contradiction is to put “transparency” as a value that will 
be openly practiced by local governments and endorsed by public evaluation. 
Only after years of closed-door negotiations are reports on the progress of the negotiations 
being given to European and American parliamentarians and their recommendations are 
simply noted by the committees. However, the treatment is different for the companies, be-
cause instead of being a trilateral negotiation (Parliamentarians, Executive and Companies), 
what has been demonstrated is a bilateral format, companies and representatives of the exe-
cutive branch, CEOs with finance ministers and directors of Central banks.
Negotiations around domestic regulations are actually about deregulation. For, upon en-
tering into force, TISA will facilitate the entry of foreign services by obtaining licenses to 
authorize the open circulation of a certain service. This means, break down the barriers of 
national legislation that use licensing and service authorizations to ensure local competiti-
veness, taxing them and making them follow the rules at different levels of territorial and 
political organization.
In order to have a dimension of these texts, we observe that the areas of state control such 
as energy, state-owned enterprises and government purchases are also part of the agree-
ment’s future plans. The texts being negotiated suggest that the discussions proceed towards 
proposals for a change in dispute settlement arrangements, a complete change in the WTO’s 
state-to-state media-tion framework. Companies in a given country, will have the right to 
process the state govern-ment, in the investor-state format, if the TISA terms are not obser-
ved, thus constituting a new legal regulatory framework outside the WTO (Kelsey, 2016). 
One of the WTO study reports on TISA discusses how agreements within and outside the 
WTO structure would be effected. The authors find that TISA would force changes in the main 
clauses at the foundation the GATT (Articles V and X). The text also suggests that China was 
interested in entering the treaty but was denied admission for the obvious reason, that the 
agreement is be-ing drawn up against Chinese interests. 
Similar elements of TISA can be found in the TTIP, a free trade agreement between the U.S. 
and European Union. More directly, the agreement gives a message that “we resolve our own 
busi-ness issues”. The degree of integration of these economies, as well as their joint action 
in geopoli-tics, facilitates the interaction of transnational interests, making this agreement 
the largest trade and investment treaty ever negotiated in the world, proposing an area of 
free trade never seen before.
Fuente: Trade SEI 
on the TTIP-In-
terim Technical 
Report, Comission 
EU, 2016
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After 15 rounds, the document that is divided into three parts: market access, regulatory 
compo-nents and rules, sets an even more ambitious scenario. It is designed to do more than 
change eco-nomic perspectives, but will also have impacts on social, environmental, agro-
food, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, mechanical engineering, electric good, motor 
vehicles, air and sea trans-portation, consultations and communications, and obviously, the 
financial sector.
Regarding dispute settlement, the document shows that there are divergences between 
countries, reflecting the discussions in the WTO, proposing a revision of the current rules. 
And a specific group was set up for the financial sector to work on the EU proposal.
As a way to strengthen the interests of the various financial and business groups in the 
TTIP ne-gotiations, a set of 14 private sector associations supported by the US Chamber of 
Commerce created the Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Coherence (TFRC) or simply the 
Transatlantic Business Council (TABC). This robust council has as its main objective to inclu-
de preferential clauses on regulatory cooperation. In this select group are financial sector 
giants such as Banco Bilbao Viscaya (chairman of the board) and Deutsche Bank, gas and oil 
corporations Chevron, Exxon and Statoil, and car manufacturers like Audi and Ford.
Negotiators aimed to format the body of the treaty in 2016, but the U.S. election of Donald 
Trump have made the future of the TTIP a mystery. The administration of President Barack 
Obama (2008-2016) and the Democratic Party have engaged in large-scale free trade treaties, 
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was negotiated with countries such as Ca-
nada, Peru, Mexico, Japan, Vietnam, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, with the 
discourse that this would bring more jobs to the U.S.
Drafted in 2005 but prioritized by the US authorities in 2010 to be ratified in 2017, the TPP 
would be a continuation of TTIP with countries in the Pacific surrounding China’s maritime 
terri-tory. The TPP corresponds to 37.4% of world GDP and 25.9% of global trade. The treaty 
pro-poses to modify national laws that correspond to market access, government procure-
ment, intel-lectual property, investment in terms of the  Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS), labor and environment, market access for services and investment, pharmaceutical 
and medical device pur-chasing and state-owned enterprises.
And each point has an objective that further distances itself from the WTO. As we have sta-
ted at the beginning of the text, the main purpose of the agreement is not tariffs but non-tari-
ff legisla-tion, as the WTO’s main task of tariff reduction has been achieved, though not as the 
developing countries wanted. As Stiglitz (2014) puts it, the vital goal of the corporations that 
make up the TPP agreement is to change labor laws, consumer protections, the environment 
and the economy in general.
The State Owned Enterprises/Investor-State format would be imposed by an international 
court with supranational laws. In the factsheets released by the governments of the countries 
of the TPP there is always a care to inform that in this format their companies would have a 
better envi-ronment to compete in other markets, and that this would bring minimal impacts 
on national economies, as if this were easy to predict.
The TPP treaty would have a direct impact on China and its surroundings, since the coun-
tries that surround it have deep economic relations (Japan) and historical (Vietnam), as well 
as in the countries Chile and Peru that are the entry to South America. It would also affect 
Brazil, by dis-tancing Chile and Peru from the influence of Mercosur.
TISA/TTIP/TPP: A reaction to the BRICS
Looking at BRICS countries’ strategy of investing in WTO space and mechanisms in order 
to influence the negotiations and win part of their sectoral demands, we see that there is an 
asym-metry between participating countries. Much of the criticism of the BRICS in the WTO 
focus on explicit inequalities in the flow of international trade, unequal treatment of develo-
ping countries in the negotiations, and their difficulties in gaining access to markets that are 
already monopo-lized and protected.
When attempting to reform the institution, it can be said that the BRICS aim for reform wi-
thin the current order. BRICS countries have functioned with a dynamic of sectoral meetings 
be-tween companies and governments. While they have advanced in the exchange of infor-
mation, creation of forums, signatures of agreements and sectoral agreements in energy, 
agriculture and transport, nothing is comparable to the dimensions proposed by TISA/TTIP/ CO
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TPP. For the BRICS proposal is not based on free trade based on deregulation of the economy.
One of the spaces used and reinforced by the BRICS countries is the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body. In a brief analysis of the progress of this organ, we can see the lack of dynamism in 
resolv-ing pending issues immobilizes the expansion of the most peripheral sectors of the 
economy of the poorest countries.
A classic example of the lack of dynamism of the WTO was the case of US cotton subsidies, 
the process (Subsidies Upland Cotton) triggered by Brazil accompanied by third party coun-
tries that are impacted by the subsidies such as Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad, 
China, Euro-pean Community, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, Japan and Thailand. It 
took 12 years (2002-2014) to come to an agreement mainly because of the U.S., which in 2012 
announced that they would not change its Farm Bill. This measure meant that Brazil did not 
sign the agreement that year until legislation changes were implemented in the US.
Analyzing how BRICS countries use the Dispute Settlement Body, it is possible to see how 
much Brazil and India, since they are countries that are part of the WTO longer than the 
others, and see their economies being undermined by the protectionism of developed coun-
tries, use this mechanism in the perspective of achieving greater openness for their exports.
Figure 2: WTO Dispute Settlement – BRICS vs. USA/EU/Canada/Japan.
By identifying the processes that were raised and their nature, we note the tendency of de-
vel-oped countries (US, EU, Canada and Japan) to open proceedings against BRICS subsidies of 
industrialized products. With the exception of China, the BRICS countries have difficulties in 
competing in this sector with businesses needing subsidies in order to survive and establish 
them-selves nationally and internationally.
China, on the other hand, after the adhering to the terms imposed, found in the WTO the 
space to demonstrate the contradictions of the practice of the liberalization of the inter-
national trade. Consequently, it has become the most demanded country with little time of 
adhesion. The tacti-cal use of planning the economic sector in the combination of various 
internal and external fac-tors, becoming the buyer of cheap raw materials, of strengthening 
the national industrial park and opening up to multinational facilities, coupled with the dy-
namism of the services sector, Econo-my in the main competitor of the contemporary world.
Of the total of 31 complaints made by Brazil in the WTO, 22 of them are directed to the 
block of developed countries (USA, EU, Japan and Canada) and Brazil responses to 12 lawsuits 
from this block. China is the claimant in 15 lawsuits and all of them are against developed 
countries, and is respondent in 39 cases. Russia with less time as a WTO member, has sued 
developed countries 4 times and is being sued in 5 cases. India is a claimant against developed 
countries in 17 of its 23 cases, and 18 of the 24 cases in which India is a defendant were brou-
ght by developed countries. South Africa as an exception to the rule, has not sued or been 
sued by developed countries.
Even with limits set by the Dispute Settlement Body, developed countries often continue to 
practice the acts that were challenged by their competitors, hardly implementing decisions 
in their entirety, and continuing to use maneuvers to protect the impacted sector.
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The WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi (December 2015) presented an understanding 
on the agenda of agricultural trade liberalization as foreseen in the Doha Round (initiated 
in 2001) where developed countries are expected to eliminate and / or reduce agricultural 
export subsidies and receive symmetrical treatment as with industrialized products. This has 
been a priority for developing countries. Yet we have seen only partial implementation. The 
apparent outcome of this measure reflects the slowness of WTO priorities with developing 
countries.
However, most of the cases in the Dispute Settlement are not based on services, but on 
goods, merchandise and patents/intellectual property. The TISA and TTIP are designed to 
anticipate commercial disputes in the service sector. They represent, on the one hand, a li-
beralization project, and on the other hand, an action of self-preservation of their markets 
against current and poten-tial enemies. In this way, the services sector is the frontier that 
developed countries are not will-ing to cede to developing countries and the BRICS. The WTO 
as it currently stands is not in a position to submit a single disciplinary regime that all mem-
bers will accept horizontally.
To answer the question of why developed countries are negotiating preferential service 
agree-ments to the exclusion of the BRICS and other developing countries, we will examine 
the role of this sector in this block.
The most recent data (fig.3-4), according to the division of the economic sectors’ partici-
pation in the BRICS, shows the expansion of the tertiary sector (services) as a percentage of 
GDP. From 2005-2014 the services sector became a priority in the composition of the econo-
mic framework of the BRICS countries. Brazil’s service sector comprised more than 70% of its 
GDP in 2014, China in 2005 had a service sector in second place behind the industry, by 2014 
the service sector passed it to comprise 60% of the GDP, 25% more than the industrial sector.
Figure 3: GDP 
BRICS 2005 – 
BRICS Joint Sta-
tistical Publication 
(2015)
Sector primario
Sector secundario
Sector terciario
Figure 4: GDP 
BRICS 2014 – 
BRICS Joint Sta-
tistical Publication 
(2015) 
Sector primario
Sector secundario
Sector terciario
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When analyzing the statistics (Figure 5-6), we observe the participation of the services sec-
tor (ex-port and import/BPM6) of the developed countries, G7 and BRICS. Though still he-
gemonic, there is a relative drop in the participation of developed and G7 countries, and a 
slight increase in BRICS in recent years, already concentrating around 15% of world exports 
and imports.
In the ranking of exporting countries, China represented 4.6% (2014) and India 3.2% (2014), 
Russia 1.4% (2014), Brazil 0.8% (2014) worldwide. Already in 2015, China increases its share 
with 6%, India 3.3%, Russia 1.1%, and Brazil 0.7%. In imports in 2014, China 8.1%, India 2.6%, 
Russia 2.5%, and Brazil 1.8% worldwide. In 2015 China increases its share with 10.1%, India 
2.7%, Russia 1.9%, and Brazil 1.5%. So, what we can observe is that China, India and Russia are 
potential competitors with developed countries.
Conclusion: Possible Impacts in Brazil
The possible impacts of the TISA/TTIP/TPP treaties are still unpredictable for Brazil and 
more studies of quantitative and qualitative content are needed to better base ourselves if 
these agree-ments come into force in the short term. The fact that the services sector has an 
expressive partic-ipation in Brazil’s GDP and its growth in foreign trade shows how the sector 
is following world trends, and stands out in relation to the agricultural and industrial sectors 
Figure 5: Services 
Export BPM6 – 
UNCTAD
Figure 6: Services 
Import BPM6 – 
UNCTAD
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in the domestic sector.
Although the service sector has the largest share of GDP, it is not as significant in foreign 
trade. Between 2009 and 2015, services reached a maximum of 14.8% (2014 and 2015) relative 
to trade in goods, averaging 13.6%, in the time period. In imports, services represented 27.1% 
(2014) and 28.54% (2015). As imports are larger than exports, there is an increasing service 
trade deficit of U.S. $ 17.8 billion (2009), U.S. $ 48.2 billion (2014) and U.S. $ 35.9 billion (2015). 
Overall, the services sector in exports reached only 1.65% (2014) and 1.91% (2015) as a percen-
tage of GDP and imports 3.65% (2014) and 4% (2015). This demonstrates that the sector is not 
a high priority for Brazilian foreign trade.
BRICS countries are not part of Brazil’s major partnerships, with the exception of China in 
this sector. BRICS, to a lesser extent Brazil and South Africa are significant exporters and 
importers on the world stage. When we take, for example, the year 2014, even though Brazil 
exported U$39.8 bi and imports U$87 bi, with the BRICS, the exported values were U$444.9 
million and imported U$872.8 million, representing a little over 1.1% of total exports and 
1.8% of Brazilian imports. 
Brazil’s dependence on the external sector vis-à-vis the developed countries is visible, de-
mon-strating the difficulty of the services sector if the TISA/TTIP/TPP agreements are put 
into prac-tice. In 2014 Brazilian service exports to developed countries were approximately 
67.5% of total service exports with the US representing 29.4%, and imported approximately 
52.1% from the US and the Low Countries. In 2015 Brazilian service exports to the US reached 
U$6.16b and to the EU were U$6.3b, representing approximately 60% of total exports. The 
same year Brazil import-ed, respectively U$ 13.3b and U$22.8b, in other words, there is a 
significant trade deficit.
So we can make some predictions as to what may occur to Brazil if the TISA were implemen-
ted as the leaked documents indicate:
a) There is a mutual dependence in the service sector between Brazil and the US/EU, as 
Brazil is a large importer. If the TISA were implemented, countries of the US/EU would res-
trict imports of Brazilian services since there would be no preferential space in the accord, 
thus in-creasing Brazil’s trade deficit.
b) At the same time, Brazil could adopt restrictions for these countries giving priority to 
BRICS country members.
These possibilities could very well change in the recent political panorama. In the case of 
the US with the 2016 election of Donald Trump of the Republican Party could result in the US 
leaving the TPP accord, though the negotiations may continue without the presence of the 
US. In Bra-zil’s case, since the institutional coup that provoked the impeachment of president 
Dilma Rousseff of the Workers Party, there has been a drastic change in foreign policy priori-
ties with increased political alignment with the US/EU block.
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